Sunday, April 25, 2010

Like Hun Sen, Like Abhisit

Op-Ed by Khmerization
24rd April 2010

“These two figures have achieved something similar in their long and short political career. Both came to powers through questionable means…..Both are very power-hungry and obstinately and poignantly refused to relinquish powers in the interests of their respective countries at a time when their countries faced political turmoil and crisis.”


The Prime Minister of Cambodia, Mr. Hun Sen, and the Prime Minister of Thailand, Mr. Abhisist Vejjajiva are two very different people, yet they have similar traits and many things in common. Mr. Hun Sen came from a peasant background, while Mr. Abhisit came from an aristocratic background. Mr. Hun Sen has no manners, while Mr. Abhisit is very mannered. Mr. Hun Sen is crude and rude, while Mr. Abhisit is well and soft-spoken. Mr. Hun Sen is lowly-educated, while Mr. Abhisit is highly educated. And both are sworn enemies from day one since the time of Mr. Abhisit’s ascension to the Thai prime ministership when his closest ally, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, allegedly swore to use Mr. Hun Sen’s blood to clean his feet just before Mr. Abhisit came to power.

However, these two figures have achieved something similar in their long and short political career. Both came to powers through questionable means, Mr. Hun Sen was propped up by the Vietnamese invading forces in 1979, while Mr. Abhisit was propped up by the royalist yellow shirt movement in 2008. Both are very power-hungry and obstinately and poignantly refused to relinquish powers in the interests of their respective countries at a time when their countries faced political turmoil and crisis.

Both had exploited the influence and the popularity of the royal institution to come to power and then cling on to it. Hun Sen lost the 1993 election, but, through Sihanouk’s pacifist approach, bullied his way into a coalition government with Funcinpec, then staged a bloody coup against it in 1997. Abhisit lost the 2008 election and bullied his way into the government after his royalist yellow shirt fellows, like Kasit Piromya, had successfully staged a long and, sometimes violent, civil unrest against the Thaksin-friendly governments of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and Mr. Somchai Wongsawat.

Mr. Hun Sen cheated to win subsequent elections in 1998, 2003 and 2008, while Mr. Abhisit, with the connivance and conspiracy of the Thai king and the supports of the army, steadfastly refused to relinquish powers, despite protracted protests from very large groups of the red shirt movement. Both are despised and hated by the majority of their fellow countrymen. Both have used the Khmer-Thai border conflict to drum up supports and stoke nationalistic fervour among nationalists for their own political gains. Both pose a great danger to their countries’ progress, wellbeing and security in the long run due to their selfish interests. Both will damage their respective countries’ developmental progress and hamper the democratic process longed for by their own people due to their vested interests and power-hunger.

It is time for them to come to their senses and relinquish their grip on powers and leave the political scene and let other competent leaders take charge. It would be good and an honour if they can do a favour for their countries and their own people by stepping down from power and live as normal citizens of their countries because the longer they try to cling to power, the more damages they have done to their reputation, family honour and respective countries. But so far, there is no sign that they will surrender their power any time soon. As the saying goes ‘like father, like son’. And in this case ‘like Hun Sen, like Abhisit’.

Sunday, April 4, 2010

Southeast Asian Mekong river countries meet China over dam fears


ABC Radio Australia

Regional nations along the Mekong river delta are holding talks with China, amid fears that Chinese dams upstream are depleting the vital waterway, plunging it to its lowest levels in decades. Leaders from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, will meet with high level delegates from China and Burma, to sign an historic declaration on how to manage the Mekong River. It follows a two-day meeting of the Mekong River Commission - the first of its kind in its 15 year history. The record low water levels in the Mekong is threatening the livelihood of over 60 million people who depend on it for their survival.

Presenter: Sen Lam
Speakers: Carl Middleton, Mekong Program Coordinator with non government organisation International Rivers



MIDDLETON: Well at the moment the situation is not clear. Obviously the low rainfall has contributed significantly to the drought but the problem is that the data hasn't been released, complete sets of data, about the operation of China's management upstream, and so that's created some suspicions downstream that their projects may be contributing in some way.

LAM: Indeed I understand some member countries of the Mekong River Commission are saying that China is showing some reluctance to sharing its data?

MIDDLETON: Actually what we've seen is some unprecedented steps for increasing data sharing. Until now, the Chinese hadn't released any dry season data, but for the current drought they've released dry season data from the two lower stations on the river. But they've just completed a new project that started filling its reservoir last year, and they haven't yet released the data for the water levels in that new dam, which is one of the highest arch-dams in the world.

LAM: I understand that leaders from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will sign an historic declaration on how to manage the Mekong River, together with China and Burma. Do we know what this declaration is likely to contain?

MIDDLETON: It's likely to include an affirmation of a commitment to share the river. A statement that came out of a technical meeting a couple of days before, that was read to the prime ministers, it seems that there's also an affirmation of a commitment for more irrigation and for more hydro-power development. And this is a bit worrying because at the moment the fisheries of the Mekong River provide food security for millions of people, and this of course we see how extensive hydro-power development can coincide with the continuation of the productivity of the fisheries, which at the moment is the most productive in the world.

LAM: So do you think the countries downstream, countries like Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, do you think they would try and seek some kind of assurance from China? Is that being sought?

MIDDLETON: Well first of all, what's important is that all countries work to share the river together. At the moment only the four lower Mekong countries - Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia - are members of the Mekong River Commission. And especially now, that China has built these projects it's important for deeper cooperation with China. About 18 per cent of the water of the Mekong comes from China. So then there's a number of other challenges that also need to be met, including not beyond the current drought, the plans for this extensive infrastructure development, and many people along the river wouldn't want to see these projects built, especially projects on the Mekong River's mainstream. So I think it's also important the affirmation that comes out of this summit is to listen closely to the voices of the people of the region, and their hopes for the vision of the basin.

LAM: And Carl Middleton, I understand that your organisation, International Rivers, chaired a public meeting which ran alongside the summit on the weekend. What did the meeting call for?

MIDDLETON: The meeting largely called for the leaders to listen to the voices of the people. There was a lot of discussion about the drought and it called on China to release the complete sets of data. China was present at the meeting, and it explained its position. But there was also a recognition that the projects have had a longer term impact on downstream communities in northern Thailand. And there needs to start being discussion about compensation, and then also discussion about how to change the operation of the downstream and minimise impact downstream.

LAM: Are there signs already that the lower water levels of the Mekong are beginning to affect the livelihood of the estimated 60 million people who live in the region?

MIDDLETON: The people in Yunnan province in China and northern Thailand, northern Laos and the Shan state of Burma, have all already been seriously affected by this drought. It's affected access to drinking water, to irrigation water, it's affecting fisheries and it's affecting transportation on the rivers that's affecting trade. So already, they're suffering from the impact of this drought.

LAM: To your mind how do you think countries in the region, what do you think they should do to better manage the resources of the mighty Mekong?

MIDDLETON: I think there needs to be a deeper recognition of the current role that the Mekong plays in the development of the region. So the fact that the fisheries feed 60 million people of the region is already very important. So when considering plans for hydro-power for example, the existing environment needs to be taken into account. And I think finally, the river isn't just an economic resource, it's also a cultural inspiration. And so I think there also needs to be serious thought about these values that the river provides for inspiration for the people of the region.

From cursing Abhisit ... to having to shake his hand

Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, left, greets his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen during their meeting in Thailand's southern resort town of Hua Hin Sunday, April 4, 2010. Hun Sen is in Thailand to attend the 1st Mekong River Commission Summit to be concluded Monday. (AP Photo)
Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (L) shakes hands with his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen during the Mekong River summit in Hua Hin April 4, 2010. The Mekong River Commission (MRC) comprising of leaders of Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, attend a summit in Thai resort town of Hua Hin to discuss falling water levels in the mighty Mekong river. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj
Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2R) welcomes his counterparts from Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung (L), Cambodia Hun Sen (2L) and Laos Bouasone Bouphavanh during the Mekong River summit in Hua Hin April 4, 2010.The Mekong River Commission (MRC) comprising of leaders from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, attend a summit in Thai resort town of Hua Hin to discuss falling water levels in the mighty Mekong river. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj
Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2L) is accompanied by his counterparts from Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung (L), Cambodia Hun Sen (R) and Laos Bouasone Bouphavanh during the Mekong River summit in Hua Hin April 4, 2010. The Mekong River Commission (MRC) comprising of leaders from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, attend a summit in Thai resort town of Hua Hin to discuss falling water levels in the mighty Mekong river. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

Sacrava's Political Cartoon: Sdach Korn's Birthday, April 4th

Cartoon by Sacrava (on the web at http://sacrava.blogspot.com)

International Aid and Authoritarian Rule

Sunday, April 04, 2010
Opinion by MP

Good food for thought by Khmerisation on US and Chinese influence in Cambodia.

Having recently mentioned on this blog that China is a permanent fixture in SE Asia and that the real challenge lies with Cambodia to adapt foreign influences to her requirements and conditions, may I now add a few more points.

1. The US unlike China is a mature, established democracy, and Khmerisation is right to stress the positive role the Americans could bring to the ‘democratic process’ in Cambodia which is still in its nascent stage, hanging perilously by a threat.

On the other hand, being a global power and a democracy are not necessarily the same thing. The US government has what we term public opinion to adhere to, especially, in areas of foreign policy and intervention. The State Department is ultimately answerable to the American electorate who can exert moral or political influence on the direction and limits of American agenda abroad. One of the most important lessons the US State Department has drawn from foreign ventures since the Cold War years is that the US cannot become militarily embroiled in another region or country for long without drawing public outcry or backlash at home. The Vietminh cleverly exploited this weakness of US involvement in Indochina in the sixties and the seventies by launching suicidal offensives against US bases forcing the latter to increase their firepower that in turn resulted in greater losses of American and civilian lives. Because Hanoi had no public opinion to live by and its own collateral losses were not disclosed to world media, there was no obligation on its part to play by the same rules. This was also a dimension of the Vietminh’s triumph over the French at Dien Bien Phu which forced the settlement at Geneva in 1954.

Likewise, the withdrawal of American military involvement in Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 was not so much an abrupt u-turn in US foreign policy or deliberate betrayal of trust of friends and allies (South Vietnam and Cambodia), but more the culmination of the realisation that the US government and, in that sense, the American people, had reached the threshold of their resolve, and exhausted their overstretched responsibility and commitment over Indochina. After all, the war was a huge strain on American economy costing billions of dollars in public revenue and thousands of young American lives.

With this background in mind it would be sensible not to read too much into this latest gesture of US displeasure over Cambodia’s expulsion of Uyghur refugees. In any case, one feels that the US has been far too accommodating towards Phnom Penh in areas of human and civil rights since the early 1990s; the brutal grenade attack in March 1997, the bloody coup against a democratically elected government in the same year and a range of gross excesses that continue to violate ordinary Cambodians’ rights as humans no less blatantly than the much better publicised repatriation of the 12 Uyghurs.

This US forbearance may be partly in line with that pragmatism in foreign policy that has seen successive US administration going to bed with strange bedfellows: he may be a SOB, but he is our SOB! By eschewing direct confrontation with Phnom Penh, the US has also adopted an essentially advisory role in its dealing with that regime, and whether this tactic is conducive to long term mutual benefit remains to be seen. In the mean while, what is clear is that this lenient approach has only served to encourage authoritarianism and foster Cambodian people’s sense of isolation and powerlessness in relations to oppression and tyranny which is not what Americans or any people really desire.

2. It should be beyond dispute that all forms of foreign aid come with strings attached. The impact that such assistance has upon a developing nation like Cambodia depends on 2 essential criteria: a) the motives of the donors and b) those of the recipients themselves. The Japanese or South Koreans may want to involve themselves more on improving infrastructure such as roads and highways knowing improved road links and mobility will lead to greater demand for their mass produced motorised vehicles and facilitate their transportation and extraction of raw materials from the recipient country or region.

The Chinese, on the other hand, with no moral conditions attached to their aid package, are potentially the most exploitative and predatory of donors. Like the Vietminh in the sixties and the seventies, China could take on all of her European and North American rivals as well as Pacific Rim powers like Japan and S. Korea in an economic battle and prevail. As Khmerisation rightly pointed out, the immediate injection of Chinese cash and capital could be just short-lived sugar coated bait that might leave lasting bitter taste in the mouth and stomach. No conditions attached means no questions asked either way: the donor/investor undertakes not to meddle in irrelevant issues like human rights and wrongs, while the recipient grants wholesale concessions to the donor and the freedom to make speedy returns on their investment without being distracted by undue environmental, human rights concerns or verifications.

If we look at those countries that have positively absorbed or assimilated US influence starting with Japan and S. Korea in the wake of the Second World War and the Korean War respectively, they had consciously opted to embrace more than US dollars and economic investment. Rather, with the realisation that foreign influence could come and go, these countries had to take measures to modernise and erect social public institutions as foundations and platforms for their continued social growth and advancement. With sound institutions, every penny earned by the state through public taxation system or external loans and other forms of financial aid is poured straight into state coffer. The government’s main priority will then be the allocation of this money into areas of corresponding need and urgency. Without such institutions in place, Cambodia could continue to rely on foreign aid for another two hundred years and still be economically impoverished. There is no use in publicly chiding generals for stealing soldiers’ salary or for creating an army of phantoms since these individuals know that unless they make good use of opportunities that can be found through such a porous system they would have bypassed a golden chance to enrich themselves, albeit at public expense.

The onus is still therefore very much on Cambodia to choose which path she wants to tread. The climate has never been better for the country to develop and even distinguish itself among other nations in the regions. Whereas the sixties and the seventies were a maelstrom of wars, revolutions and upheavals, the world of today is much more conducive to stability and growth where no one will benefit from chaos and strife. Unless, that is, these elements force themselves upon individuals and society.